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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE USE OF CONTRIBUTIONS
COMPELLED UNDER AGENCY SHOP AGREEMENTS

Public school teachers sought a declaration that an agency shop provision violated the first amendment to the United States Constitution. 'The teachers alleged that they opposed collective bargaining in the
public sector and other political and ideological activities engaged in by
the union. The Supreme Court held that the agency shop clause was
valid insofar as service charges imposed thereby were used to finance
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,
but that first admendment principles prohibited requiring a teacher to

contribute to support an ideological cause he might oppose. Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
The agency shop agreement opposed by the teachers required them
to pay the union a service charge equal to regular union dues. 2 Under

federal law such an agreement is the "practical equivalent" of a union
shop contract, which would require an employee to join the union and to
pay normal union dues. 3 The principal justification for agency and union
shop agreements is to prevent "free riders" from enjoying the benefits of
collective bargaining without sharing in the costs of obtaining those ben-

efits.

4

The United States Supreme Court first considered the question of
the impact of union shop agreements on the first amendment rights of
employees in Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson.5 That case involved provisions of the Railway Labor Act which gave effect to agreements for union shops even if they were prohibited by state law.6 After
1. The agency shop contract was entered into pursuant to a Michigan statute which
provided that no law of Michigan would preclude a public employer from making an
agreement with a bargaining agent that required, as a condition of employment, that all
employees pay to the agent a "service fee" equal to the amount of dues required of members of the agent. 1973 Mich. Comp. Laws 423.210(i)(c).
2. The Supreme Court defined agency shops in NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S.
734, 743 (1962). See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 217 n.8. Under an agency
shop, the employee need not formally join the union. For a discussion of the distinctive
features of agency and union shops, see 3 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) $ 4510. Compelled union
membership is generally rejected in Europe. See Lenhoff, The Problem of Compulsory
Unionism in Europe, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 18, 42 (1956).
3. NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742, 743 (1962). See Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 217 n.10 (1977).
4. 96 CONG. REC. 16279 (1950) (statement of Senator Hill); Hearingson H.R. 7789,
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1950)
(statement of George M. Harrison, for the Railway Labor Executives Association).
5. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
6. 45 U.S.C. § 52(11) (1970) provides that, notwithstanding any law of any state, any
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deciding that the contested agreement constituted governmental action
for first amendment purposes, 7 the Court held that requiring beneficiaries of collective bargaining to support collective bargaining agencies
did not violate the first amendment. 8 The Court emphasized that the
funds were not exacted as a penalty or as a cover for forcing ideological
conformity, 9 and analogized the position of union members to that of
members of integrated state bar associations.1 0 The Court, however, reserved judgment on the issue of using assessments for purposes not germane to collective bargaining."
carrier and a duly authorized labor organization shall be permitted "to make agreements,

requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the
beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the
later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization." In contrast, section
14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act which permits union shops is designed to give
way before contrary state laws. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). See3 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 4510. Some
twenty states have "right to work" laws outlawing union shops. All-State Chart, I LAB. L.
REP. (CCH)
40, 350.
For an examination of arguments for and against right to work laws see Note, 40
IOWA L. REV. 621 (1953). Justice Douglas has noted that a union shop under the National
Labor Relations Act may constitute state action because the Act encourages these agreements. Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 419 U.S. 1093 (1975)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
7. 351 U.S. at 232. In a case with similar circumstances, Judge Learned Hand found
no state action to require constitutional scrutiny, because the statute only permitted rather
than required union shop agreements. Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (1953).
Other courts have also upheld section 152(1!) in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Hudson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Sandberry, 277 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
8. 351 U.S. at 238. The Court first determined that section 152(11) of the Railway
Labor Act was relevant and appropriate to Congress's powers under the commerce clause.
Id. at 233. In rejecting claims of a violation of the due process clause, involving the employees' right to work, the Court found that Congress's action might have been made with
the intent ultimately to enhance that right. Id. at 235.
9. The Court felt that provisions limiting the use to which the funds could be put, as
well as the reasons for which a member could be expelled from a union, protected the
employee from actions by the union which would force him to conform ideologically. 351
U.S. at 238.
10. 351 U.S. at 238. The conclusion reached in Hanson has been criticized on a
number of grounds. The analogy with the integrated bar, which was never fully explained,
has been said by Justice Douglas, who authored the Hanson decision, to have failed on
reflection. Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 881 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). It has
been suggested that Hanson effectively ignored the question of freedom of association.
Note, 19 GA. B.J. 550 (1957). Another author believes the question of basic individual
freedom was sidestepped with an undocumented statement. Note, 6 J. PUB. L. 263 (1957).
Justice Powell says that Hanson decided first amendment issues summarily and almost
viewed them as inconsequential. 431 U.S. at 248 (Powell, J., concurring).
11. 351 U.S. at 238.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

The Court reexamined its position on union shops in International
Association of Machinists v. Street,12 which also involved the Railway
Labor Act. In that case the plaintiff relied upon a finding by the Georgia
Supreme Court 13 that funds exacted under the union shop agreement

were used to support political candidates, to propagate political and economic doctrines, and to promote legislative programs. 14 A plurality of
justices felt that Street presented a question unanswered in Hanson: the
use of compelled contributions for political purposes.' 5 The Court
avoided the constitutional question by construing the Railway Labor Act

from a dissenting union member to
to preclude using money exacted
16
support political activities.
After recognizing that "to be required to help finance the union as
collective bargaining agent might well be thought to interfere . . . with
an employee's freedom to associate to advance beliefs"' 7 the Court in the

instant case attempted to apply the principles of Hanson and Street to
public sector employees. In its role as negotiator the union could take
positions on abortions, strikes, or even wages that would be adverse to
the views of individual members.' 8 The Court noted that Hanson and
12. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
13. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959),
rev'd, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
14. Following Hanson, many observers felt that the issue of the validity of the union
shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act had been permanently decided. The Street case
was not considered a significant challenge to that decision. See Wellington, Machinists v.
Street: Statutory Interpretationand the Avoidance of ConstitutionalIssues, 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 49, 51-54 (to the effect that no new issues were raised by the pleadings in Street that
were not also raised by Hanson); Note, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39, 63 (1961).
15. 367 U.S. at 749. The Court in Street said that the issues raised fit the exception left
by Hanson. Justice Frankfurter congently disputed this contention. 367 U.S. at 804 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For narrow interpretations of Hanson, see Note, 24 GA. B.J. 432
(1962); Note, 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 164 (1962); Note, II S.W.L.J. 88 (1957).
16. 367 U.S. at 770. This expedient resolution has been criticized as a distortion of
Congressional intent. See Note, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 170 (1961). The remedy of Street,
the return of the percentage of exacted funds used for political purposes, has been characterized as of little practical value. Note, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1513 (1961). Another author
suggests, however, that the insignificance of the remedy may be fully commensurate with
the small harm done. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1961). Street has been commended as a
useful stopgap. Note, 3 GEo. WASH.L. REv. 541 (1962). A companion case to Street, Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), involved similar first amendment issues in the context
of an order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court integrating the state bar. The record was
found insufficient for constitutional adjudication, although the Wisconsin court had taken
judicial notice of political activities of the state bar, because the plaintiff failed to allege any
particular political use of which he disapproved.
17. 431 U.S. at 227.
18. Id.at 222. See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775,
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Street had found any such impact upon first amendment rights to be
constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the union shop's
contribution to labor relations.19 The same governmental interests identified in Hanson and Street were found in Abood to support presump20
tively any first amendment deprivation caused by the Michigan statute.

The teachers advanced two reasons for distinguishing Hanson and
Street from the instant case. First, they suggested that government employment constitutes direct state action and thus differs from the permissive state action found in the two earlier cases. The Court refused to
make such a distinction at least insofar as first amendment impact was
concerned, and noted that the Hanson challenge had failed because the

Railway Labor Act was found constitutional, not because there was no
state action. 2 ' The teachers also claimed that collective bargaining in the
public sector is inherently political, and that to prevent coerced idelogical conformity the political interests of government employees should be

given greater protection than that afforded in Hanson.22 The Court refused to translate the differences in public and private sector collective
bargaining into differences in first amendment rights23 on the rationale

that the first amendment protects all expression and thought, not just
24
political interests.
After rejecting the attempt to distinguish Hanson and Street, the

Court went on to deal with an issue not decided in the two earlier cases:
780 (1961) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). It has also been recognized that significant
interests in expression are involved in collective bargaining. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 233
(1961).

19. 431 U.S. at 224.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 226. See Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
22. 431 U.S. at 226. Justice Powell, in his concurrence, sought to distinguish the "permissive" state action found in contracts allowed by the Railway Labor Act, and the "direct" state action involved in Abood Id. at 250-54. A careful reading of Hanson shows,
however, that the same scrutiny was given the constitutional issues despite the statute's
permissive form. The Court in Hanson found that the federal statute was the "source of the
power and authority by which any rights are lost or sacrificed." Railway Employees' Dep't
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232. See Board of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952);
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Although Jackson P. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974), may suggest that a contract under the Railway Labor Act is not state action, it does
not suggest that different levels of state action require differing levels of constitutional scrutiny.
23. 431 U.S. at 232.
24. Id. at 231. See UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1956); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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'25
"The use of ... fees for purposes other than collective bargaining.
The Hanson decision had been based on the premise that exacted funds
26
were to be used only for purposes germane to collective bargaining.
The holding of Street involved a statutory construction which denied
unions the power to use such funds for political purposes. In Abood the
Court found that the interests advanced by union shops do not justify
compelling contributions to ideological causes unrelated to a union's col27
lective bargaining duties.

This conclusion flows from the belief that any first amendment
28
harms can be justified only by their relation to valid state interests.
However, the adoption of the test of relation to collective bargainingas a

constitutional rule undermined the implication of Street that exacted
funds could constitutionally be used only for non-political purposes. The
Court's application of the test first used in Hanson of relation to collec-

tive bargaining means that political uses can be justified if they are so
29

related.

The political use of funds exacted from public sector employees as a
condition of their employment would appear suspect after the recent case
of Elrod v. Burns.30 In Elrod the Court relied on the right to associate to
advance beliefs3' when it held that a surrender of constitutional rights

could not be a valid predicate of public benefits. 32 Forced contributions

25. 431 U.S. at 232. The language quoted is from the authoritative decision on state
law by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 60 Mich. App. 92, 99,
230 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1976).
26. 351 U.S. at 235. It seems clear that what the Court had in mind was the use of
exactions or assessments as penalties, to enforce ideological conformity. Nevertheless, the
language used was "not germane to collective bargaining." The Court gave no indication
that political uses should be so considered.
27. 431 U.S. at 234. The Court relied on the individual's right to associate to advance
beliefs, which could not be infringed upon as a requisite for receiving public benefits.
28. 431 U.S. at 224-26, 236. See also Elrod v. Bums, 424 U.S. 347 (1976); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945).
29. One commentator has suggested that relation to collective bargaining would have
been a more satisfactory dividing line in Street. Note, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1961).
30. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Justice Rehnquist recognized this conflict in Abood 431 U.S.
at 242 (Rehnquist, J.,concurring). See also id at 244 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
31. This is of course the right abridged in the instant case. See the text at notes 17-20,
supra.The court in Street failed to recognize this right and followed Hanson in applying a
bifurcated analysis involving separate issues of association and expression. See Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 848 (1961) (Harlan, J.,concurring).
32. The concept of "benefit" here would include government employment, and em-
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infringe upon the individual's interest in being free from forced expression as well as his right to associate to advance beliefs. 33 In Abood the
Court relied upon an implicit balancing test from Hanson and Street to
decide that the legislative assessment of the union shops' importance justifies their impact on first amendment rights. This decision, however,
cannot be reconciled easily with recent standards in the first amendment
area.
The Court has used a balancing approach in cases where a state, in
the exercise of its power to achieve a legitimate purpose, incidentally has
encroached upon first amendment rights. 34 According to current principles, "a significant impairment of first amendment rights must survive
exacting scrutiny." 35 The government must show a paramount interest 36
and that the abridgement is necessary to further that interest. 37 A high
standard has been applied in determining whether these requirements
are met. 38 The Court in Aboodwas divided on the kind of impact on first
amendment rights that could be justified by the government interests of
labor peace and the distribution of the costs of union activities. A minority of three justices39 maintained that the interests advanced would not
justify compelled political support as a condition of public employment.
The plurality, on the other hand, recognized that the Constitution protects all types of thought and speech, not merely political interests. 40
Thus, in balancing individual and state interests, the Court should consider the extent and not the nature of the first amendment abridgement.4 '
ployment regulated by government as in Hanson. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
33. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975);
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); West
Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942).
34. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1957); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1959); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1950); American Communications
Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Mandel v.
Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (1971).
35. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
36. Id
37. See id at 363. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).

38. On the insufficiency of a mere legitimate state interest, see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 59 (1973). On rationality, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
39. See 431 U.S. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. 431 U.S. at 228. See UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1956); Thorn-

hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The consideration given the extent of abridge-
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The basic question presented in Hanson and Aboodwas whether the
government interest in union shops justified any infringement on an employee's constitutionally protected interests. 42 Union or agency shop
agreements advance labor peace by buttressing a union's position as collective bargaining agent. 43 The existence of "free riders" may tempt
44
other employees to leave unions, to the detriment of union strength.
But even if labor peace can be termed a paramount interest, union shops
cannot be justified since they are not necessary to maintain union bargaining strength in light of proven alternatives to that end. 45 In addition,
once a majority of workers belong to a union (a requisite for union shop
agreements), that union is already certifiable as the exclusive bargaining
46
agency and has all the power it is likely to acquire.
On a less exalted plane, unions value union shop agreements because they can thereby exact dues from workers to support collective
bargaining and other activities with which the workers may well disagree.4 7 This distribution of the costs of union activities is a second governmental interest in union shops. Although couched in terms of
ment rather than its nature prevents the balancing process from becoming a purely arbitrary value judgment. SeeKonigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting). In this balancing, it should be remembered that, according to Elrod v. Burns,
any loss of first amendment freedom, even for a minimal amount of time, constitutes "irreparable injury." 427 U.S. at 350.
42. Justice Powell's position that public sector unions are indistinguishable from political parties in many respects could perhaps be applied also to private sector organizations.
431 U.S. at 256-57 (Powell, J.; concurring).
43. See the discussion of the purpose of the statute in Internationa/Ass'nof Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 759-66 (1961). Seventy-five to eighty per cent of railroad employees
were members of labor organizations by 1950 (the year prior to enactment of the Railway
Labor Act), which indicates little need for any legislation to strengthen the union's bargaining position. H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960). See also 96 CONo. REC.
16279 (1960) (statement by Senator Hill).
44. See Hearingson HR. 7789, supranote 4 (statement by George Harrison). See also
Report of the Presidential Emergency Board (May 24, 1943); Supplemental Report of the
Presidential Emergency Board (May 29, 1943). These reports considered union requests for
authorization of union shops during World War II after railway workers went on strike.
The Board found that union shops were not necessary to protect the union's bargaining
position.
45. Other devices, such as the exclusive bargaining agency under the National Labor
Relations Act, or dues checkoff, achieve much the same purpose without the constitutional
objection. See 3 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 4501.
46. See Hearingson H.R. 7789, supranote 4 (statement of George M. Harrison). See
also Note, 19 GA. B.J. 550 (1957). The author there would apply the stringent "clear and
present danger" test of Thomas v. Collins,323 U.S. 516 (1945), to determine if an abridgement is constitutionally justified.
47. See Proceedings of Presidential Emergency Board No. 98 at 150.
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preventing "free riders," in fact the government's interest is to finance
union activities with the money of unwilling contributors, the complaint
of the plaintiff in the instant case. Compelled contribution to support
another's beliefs abridges the employee's right of association to advance
48
beliefs, a right which extends into the area of collective bargaining.
The government purpose behind the promotion of union shops is to enhance the voice of unions at the expense of dissident members. This is a
goal "wholly foreign" 49 to the first amendment, and is not a valid end of
legislation.
Nevertheless, the Court held that forced contributions for uses related to collective bargaining were constitutional, without engaging in a
detailed analysis of the necessity or importance of the union shop. But by
suggesting that further decisions would consider the guidelines drawn in
Street, the Court may have confused the issues presented in the two
cases. At one point the Court suggested that funds spent for the expression of political views would be excluded from permissible use.50 This
language is inconsistent, however, with an earlier statement that the political nature of the use was not to be the key constitutional inquiry and
that collective bargaining in the public sector may of itself involve the
expression of political views. 5' Thus, expression cannot be deemed unrelated to collective bargaining solely because it is political.
In announcing the collective-bargaining-related standard, the Court
failed to delineate the degree or kind of relation required. Since lending
support to particular legislation and candidates can have a substantial
relation to the ultimate contract under which a union might work (particularly in the public sector), 52 the decision may allow unions to engage
in a broad range of political activity affecting first amendment rights
48. One author believes that the Railway Labor Act considered in Hanson had the
invalid purpose of the elimination of competition and friction. Note, 6 J. PuB. L. 263
(1957). Another author suggests union shops may in fact be aimed at those workers who
wish to dissent from union policies by withholding funds from or not joining the union.
Taff, The Casefor Voluntary Union Membership, 40 IOWA L. REV. 626 (1953). Thomas
Jefferson, in his 1779 Billfor Religious Liberty,called compelled contributions for the propagation of ideas "sinful and tyrannical." I. BRANT, MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 354
(1948).
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). On the requirement that the government interest be distinct from constitutional abridgement, see Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366
U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
50. 431 U.S. at 235-36. The Court said that funds for the expression of political views,
on behalf of candidates, or for the advancement of other ideological causes not related to
collective bargaining, must be financed by uncoerced contributions.
51. Id at 231.
52. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (Black &
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more significantly than is at first apparent. Further litigation may supply
a rationale for prohibiting unions from using forced contributions for
certain purposes. For example, a distinction could be based on the extent
of the abridgement of the individual rights.53 However, a basic rethinking of the judgment espoused in Abood (and attributed to Hanson and
Street) would be a preferable resolution. Such a reexamination would
require, of course, an articulation of state interests that might justify the
first amendment impact of union shops.
Paul S, Hughes

HEARSAY AND THE CONFRONTATION GUARANTY

During defendant's trial for aggravated rape, hearsay evidence was
adniitted pertaining to a medical examination of the alleged victim by an
assistant coroner who was not called as a witness.' The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed 2 and held that admission of a business record as
an exception to the hearsay rule is contingent upon proof of the entrant's
unavailability. The court noted that introduction of the evidence without
such proof probably violates the state3 and federal 4 constitutional guarDouglas, JJ., dissenting). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 236; Note, 75
HARV. L. REV. 233 (1961).
53. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 59 (1976). It is arguable that the impact on
-employees of the use of their compelled contributions for a particular purpose may not be
substantial or significant enough to warrant judicial relief. This line of thought is conceptually different from an inquiry into whether there is any impact brought about by those
uses.

1. The trial court admitted the evidence under LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 105 which
states: "A coroner's report and a proces verbal of an autopsy shall be competent evidence
of death and the cause thereof, but not of any other fact."
2. The Louisiana Supreme Court found Code of Criminal Procedure article 105 inapplicable because the evidence was not used as evidence of death or the cause thereof, but of
the presence of sperm in the alleged victim's vagina.
The state also argued that the coroner's report should be admissible under the exception for hospital records, LA. R.S. 13:3714 (Supp. 1966), but the supreme court found this
statute inapplicable because there was no evidence introduced to prove the examination
was conducted in a hospital.
3. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16 provides in part: "An accused is entitled to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to present
a defense, and to testify in his own behalf." See also La. Const. art. I, § 9 (1921).

